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Abstract   We discuss the issues and opportunities raised by Agile practices in the 
development of high-integrity software, based on the scientific literature, projects, 
and our own understanding of relevant regulatory regimes, standards, and mar-
kets. We consider Agile assumptions and where these conflict with high-integrity 
development. Conversely, we also consider opportunities where an Agile ap-
proach could be improved by the adoption of high-integrity practices. 
1 Introduction 
There is much interest in Agile engineering, especially for software development. 
Agile¶s proponents promote its flexibility, lean-ness, and ability to manage chang-
ing requirements, and deride the plan-driven or waterfall approach. Detractors 
criticize Agile¶s free-for-all. 
At Altran UK, we use disciplined and planned engineering, particularly when it 
comes to high-integrity systems that involve safety, security, or other critical 
properties. A shallow analysis is that Agile is anathema to high-integrity systems 
development, but this is a naïve reaction. Pertinent questions include: 
ವ Is Agile compatible with high-integrity? 
ವ Where is Agile inappropriate? 
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ವ Do Agile¶s assumptions hold for high-integrity or embedded systems? 
ವ Could high-integrity best-practice improve Agile? 
We don¶t have all the answers, but we hope this article continues to provoke 
debate on this important topic. 
1.1 Why bother with Agile at all? 
We often encounter two myths regarding the ³WUDGLWLRQDO´ approach to high-
integrity software development: that we somehow manage to perform a single-
iteration waterfall style process, and that ³IRUPDO´ notations are not amenable to 
change. Neither ring true with our experience. As our projects develop, they have 
to absorb change and respond to defects just like any other. This led to an observa-
tion: your project is going to become iterative whatever you do, so you might as 
well plan it that way from the beginning. This lesson was put to good effect in the 
MULTOS CA project (Hall 2002), which initially planned for seven iterations, but 
delivered after thirteen, owing to a barrage of change requests. Nevertheless, it 
worked, and we were able to keep a substantial formal specification and all the 
other design documentation up to date as the project evolved. Knowing that 
³FKDQJH´ and ³LWHUDWLRQ´ were at the heart of the Agile manifesto, we decided to 
see what we could learn and bring to future projects. 
 
2 Background and Sources 
Many consider Agile started with XP (Beck 1999), but its roots are much older. 
Many of XP¶s core practices were well-established long ago²their combination 
and rigorous practice was novel. A survey (Larman 2003) notes that both incre-
mental and iterative styles of engineering were used in the 1950s. Redmill¶s work 
on evolutionary delivery (Redmill 1997) predicted many of the problems faced by 
Agile projects. (Boehm 2003) provides some useful insight, while the develop-
ment of MULTOS CA (Hall 2002) compared Correctness-by-Construction with 
XP (Chapman 2003), showing that the two weren¶t such strange bed-fellows after 
all. 
Lockheed Martin developed the Mission Computers for the C130J by combin-
ing semi-formal specification, strong static verification, iterative development, and 
a strongly Lean mind-set (Middleton 2005). Use of Agile has been reported by 
Thales Avionics (Chenu 2009), while SINTEF have reported success with 
SafeScrum (SINTEF 2015). A recent and plain-speaking evaluation of Agile 
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comes from (Meyer 2014), although he doesn¶t specifically deal with high-
integrity issues. 
3 Agile Assumptions and Issues 
How do Agile¶s practices and assumptions match real high-integrity projects? 
Here are some of the most obvious clashes. For each issue, we start with a brief 
recap of the practice in question, then go on to describe the issue or perceived 
clash, followed by our ideas and experiences in overcoming it. Where possible, we 
close each section with an example of our experience from the C130J, MULTOS, 
or iFACTS projects. 
3.1 Dependence on ³Test´  
Agile calls for continuous integration, with a regression test suit, and a test-first 
development style, with each function associated with specific tests. Meyer calls 
these practices ³EULOOLDQW´ in his summary analysis (Meyer 2014), but Agile as-
sumes that dynamic test is the principal (possibly only) verification activity, say-
ing when refactoring is complete, or when the product is good enough to ship. 
The safety-critical community hit the limits of testing long ago. Ultra-reliability 
FDQ¶W be claimed from ³lots of testing.´ Security is even harder²corner-case vul-
nerabilities, such as HeartBleed, defy an arbitrarily large amount of testing and 
use. In high-integrity development, we use diverse forms of verification, including 
checklist-driven reviews, automated static verification, traceability analysis, and 
structural coverage analysis. 
There is no barrier between these verification techniques and Agile, especially 
with an automated integration pipeline. We try to use verification techniques that 
complement, not repeat each other. If possible, we advocate for sound static 
analyses (tools that find all the bugs, not just some of them), since this gives 
greater assurance and reduces pre-test defect density. With careful consideration 
of the assumptions that underpin the static analyses (Kanig 2014), we can reduce 
or entirely remove later testing activities. 
The NATS iFACTS system (Chapman 2014) augments the software tools 
available to air-traffic controllers in the UK. It supplies electronic flight-strip 
management, trajectory prediction, and medium-term conflict detection for the 
UK¶V en-route airspace, giving controllers substantially improved ability to plan 
ahead and predict potential loss-of-separation in a sector. The developers precede 
commit, build, and testing activities with static analysis using the SPARK toolset. 
Overnight, the integration server re-builds an entire proof of the software, populat-
ing a persistent cache, accessible to all developers next morning. Working on an 
isolated change, the developers can reproduce the proof of the entire system in 
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about 15 minutes on their desktop machines, or in a matter of seconds for a 
change to a single module. While Agile projects might have a ³GRQ¶W break the 
WHVWV´ mantra, on iFACTS LW¶V ³GRQ¶W break the proof (or the tests)«´ 
3.2 Upfront Activities and Architecture 
Agile advocates building what¶s needed now, using re-factoring to defer deci-
sions. Refactoring must be cheap, fast, and limit rework to source code.  
Our principal weapon in meeting non-functional requirements is system (not 
just software) architecture, including redundancy and separation of critical from 
non-critical. Such things can be prohibitively expensive to refactor late in the day. 
We need just enough upfront architecture work to argue satisfaction of key prop-
erties. We also do a ³:KDW If?´ exercise to make sure that the proposed architec-
ture can accommodate foreseeable changes. 
The MULTOS CA project had some extraordinary security requirements, 
which were met by a carefully considered combination of physical, operational, 
and computer-based mechanisms. The software design was much simplified as a 
result of this whole system view. The physical measures included the provision of 
a bank vault and enclosing Faraday cage²hardly items that we could have ig-
nored and then ³UHIDFWRUHG LQ´ later. 
3.3 User Stories and Non-Functional Requirements 
For security and safety, we must ensure our specification covers all possible inputs 
and states. Agile uses stories to document requirements, but these sample behav-
ior, with no completeness guarantee. The gaps between stories may contain vul-
nerabilities, bugs, unexpected termination, and undefined behavior. Meyer files 
user stories under ³Bad and Ugly´, and we agree. 
For critical systems, we prefer a (semi-)formal specification that offers some 
hope of completeness. The C130J used Parnas Tables to specify critical functions. 
They seemed to work well²they were simple enough to be understood by system 
engineers, yet sufficiently formal to be implemented and analyzed for correctness. 
3.4 Sprint Pipeline 
Agile usually requires a single active ³6SULQW´ delivered immediately to the cus-
tomer, so only two builds are ever of interest: 
 Build N: in operation with the customer; used to report defects. 
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 Build N+1: the current development sprint. 
This assumes the customer is always able to accept delivery of the product and 
use it immediately. This LVQ¶W realistic for high-integrity projects. Some customers 
have their own acceptance process, and regulators may have to assess the system 
before deployment. These processes can be orders-of-magnitude slower than a 
typical Agile tempo. 
iFACTS uses a deeper pipeline and multiple iteration rates, with at least four 
builds in the pipeline: 
 Build N: in operation with the customer. 
 Build N+1: undergoing customer acceptance. This process is subject to regula-
tory requirements, and so can take months. 
 Build N+2: in development and test. 
 Build N+3: undergoing requirements and formal specification. 
All four pipeline stages run concurrently with multiple internal iteration rates 
and delivery standards. The development team can deliver to our test team several 
times a day. A rapid build can be delivered to the customer (in, say, 24 hours), but 
comes with limitations on its assurance package and allowed use: it LVQ¶W intended 
for operational use, but for feedback from the customer on a new feature. A full 
build (perhaps once every 6 months) has a complete assurance package, including 
a safety case, and is designed for eventual operation. The trick is to make the itera-
tion rates harmonic, both with each other and with the customer and UHJXODWRU¶V 
ability to accept and deploy releases. 
3.5 Embedded Systems Issues 
Agile presumes plentiful availability of fast testing resources to drive the devel-
opment pipeline. For embedded systems, if the hardware exists, there may be just 
one or two target rigs that are slow, hostile to automation, and difficult to access. 
We have seen projects revert to 24-hour-a-day shift-working to allow access to the 
target hardware. 
In mitigation, we reduce on-target testing with more static verification. Second-
ly, if we know that code is completely unambiguous, then we can justify testing 
on host development machines and reduce the need to repeat the test runs on tar-
get. Hardware simulation can give each developer a desktop virtual target or a fast 
cloud for the deployment pipeline. While virtualization of popular microproces-
sors is common, high-fidelity simulation of a target¶s operating environment re-
mains a significant challenge. 
On one embedded project, all development of code, static analysis and testing 
is done on developers¶ host machines, which are plentiful, fast, and offer a friend-
ly environment. A final re-run of the test cases is performed on the target hard-
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ware with the expectation of pass-first-time, and allowing the collection of struc-
tural coverage data at the object-code level. 
4 Opportunities 
High-integrity practices can complement Agile. We¶ve already mentioned the use 
of static verification tools. While we have a preference for developer-led, sound 
analysis, we recognize that some projects might find more benefit in unsound, but 
easier to adopt, technologies, such as bounded model checking. Computing power 
is readily available to make these analyses tractable at an Agile tempo. 
A second opportunity comes with the realization that, if we can automate anal-
ysis, building and testing of code, when why not automate the production of other 
artefacts, such as synthesis of code from formal models, traceability analysis, and 
all the other documentation that might be required by a particular customer, regu-
lator or standard? An example of such an ³(YLGHQFH (QJLQH´ is shown in Figure 1. 
5 Commercial Issues 
A crucial issue: how can we adopt an Agile approach, and still estimate, bid, win, 
and deliver projects at a reasonable profit? Our FXVWRPHUV¶ default approach is 
often to require a competitive bid at a fixed price, but how can this be possible in 
an Agile fashion if ZH¶UH brave enough to admit that we GRQ¶W know everything at 
the start of a project? In most of our projects, the users, procurers, and regulators 
are distinct groups, all of whom may have wildly different views of what ³$JLOH´ 
means anyway. 
We have had good experience with a two-phase approach to contracting, akin 
to the ³DUFKLWHFWEXLOGHU´ model for building a house. Phase 1 consists of the ³8p-
IURQW´ work²requirements, architectural design, and construction of a skeletal 
satisfaction argument. The ³MXVW HQRXJK´ termination criteria for phase 1 are: 
ವ Convincing evidence that the architecture will work, meet non-functional re-
quirements, and can accommodate foreseeable change. 
ವ An estimate of the size (and therefore cost) of the remaining work, given the 
currently understood scope. 
ವ Established ground-rules for agreeing the scope, size and additional cost of 
change requests, and commitment to the tempo of decision making for triage of 
changes and defects. 
Phase 2 (possibly a competitive bid) could be planned as an iterative development, 
using the ideas set out above. The MULTOS CA was delivered in this fashion, 
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with phase 1 on a time-and-materials basis, and phase 2 on a capped-price risk-
sharing contract. 
6 High-Integrity Deployment Pipeline 
We¶ve used the ideas in this article at Altran, but we¶ve yet to deploy all of them 
at once. An idealized Agile development process would use: 
ವ Principled requirements engineering (Jackson 2000), concentrating initially on 
non-functional requirements and development of architecture, specification, 
and associated satisfaction arguments. 
ವ A rolling formal specification, with just enough formality to estimate the re-
maining work and opening development iterations. 
ವ An evidence engine, combining static verification, continuous regression test-
ing, automated generation of documents and assurance evidence, and a cloud of 
virtualized target platforms for integration and deployment testing. 
ವ A planned, iterative development style, starting with a partial-order over sys-
tem infrastructure and features that exposes potential for parallel development. 
Early iterations are planned in detail, while the plans for later iterations are left 
open to accommodate change. 
7 Conclusions 
Returning to the questions posed in section 1, we could summarize our findings as 
follows: 
x No clash: continuous integration, verification-driven development style, 
continuous regression testing, and an explicitly planned iterative ap-
proach. 
x Potential clash or inappropriate: over-dependence on test as the sole ver-
ification activity, minimizing upfront activities in the face of non-
functional requirements, the incompleteness of user stories (especially for 
secure systems), the need to align sprints and iteration rates with custom-
ers and regulators ability to accept deliveries, and the (non-)availability 
of test hardware for embedded systems. 
x Agile assumptions: customer decision making power and tempo, availa-
bility of plentiful test hardware, and commercial and contractual models 
needed to ³SURFXUH Agile.´ 
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x Opportunities: Adoption of formal languages, automated synthesis and 
static verification as part of the deployment pipeline. Generalization of 
continuous integration into an ³(YLGHQFH (QJLQH´ 
We¶re deploying these ideas on further projects, and look forward to being able to 
report the results. We hope others will do the same. 
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Figure 1: High-Integrity Agile Evidence Engine 
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